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ABSTRACT In this article I pose the question, ‘where is the biological body
in medical sociology today?’ The first part of the article provides a selective
corporeal balance sheet of where we are now in medical sociology, with
particular reference to social constructionist and phenomenological
approaches and their respective stances or takes on the (biological) body. The
subsequent section considers where we might profitably be going in the future
in terms of bringing the biological body (back) in, and the broader issues this
raises for the sociological enterprise as a whole. Various problems associated
with this evolving project and merits of other recent approaches, such as the
sociology of translation, are considered. The article concludes with some
further thoughts and reflections on these matters, including a revisiting of
relations between the sociology of the body and medical sociology in the light
of these debates.
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Introduction
In this article I pose the seemingly simple, yet on closer inspection complex
and contested question, ‘where is the biological body in medical sociology
today?’ This may sound an odd question to ask a sociological audience. It
also, of course, begs a series of further questions, not least as to why the
biological body should matter to sociologists anyway, particularly those with
little or no professed interest in body matters, biological or otherwise, and
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what this might entail should, per chance, it turn out to be an important
question after all.
The body is very much alive and kicking in recent sociological scholar-
ship and debate – part and parcel of broader corporeal trends – both inside
and outside the academy. On the one hand, this is surely welcome and long
overdue, challenging many former assumptions and problematic divisions
along the way. On the other hand, I venture, it has created its own tensions
if not outright problems. The body, it seems, is everywhere and nowhere
today – a victim of its own success perhaps? A paradox, moreover, lies at
the heart of these corporeal debates. For all this alleged interest, the body,
in certain (dominant) strands of thinking at least, remains peculiarly disem-
bodied, disembowelled, disincarnated or dematerialized (Birke, 1999), call
it what you will; a body allowed (back) in (Frank, 1991), so to speak, but
one which is credited more or less wholesale to the social side of the balance
sheet in doing so. Hence the pertinence of the seemingly rogue or repressed
question posed above, is there a place for the biological body in all this?
Medical sociology, or the sociology of health and illness as it is now more
commonly known,1 is certainly a good place to examine these issues, dealing
as it does with matters of life and death. To the extent moreover that
professional rivalries are evident here (Strong, 1979), not least concerning
the nature and status of biomedicine, this may indeed provide a useful
window looking to other important dimensions of these debates and
struggles over the body today in sociology and beyond. To concede a
biological body, in other words, may come at too high a price for some
(medical) sociologists.
The article is divided into two main parts. The first provides a somewhat
selective corporeal balance sheet of where we are now in medical sociology,
with particular reference to social constructionist and phenomenological
approaches and their respective stances or takes on the (biological) body.
The second builds on these corporeal debates, considers where we might
profitably be going in the future in terms of bringing the biological body
(back?) in, and the broader issues this raises for the sociological enterprise
as a whole. Various problems associated with this project are also considered
– particularly in terms of the (un)knowable body and the complexity of these
biology–society relations themselves – alongside other recent attempts to
resolve these issues through the sociology of translation and the enactment
of reality in practice. The article concludes with some further thoughts and
reflections on these matters, including a revisiting of relations between the
sociology of the body and medical sociology in the light of these debates.
Where are we now then as far as the (biological) body is concerned?
Current state of play: a corporeal balance sheet
Medical sociology, in many respects, has always been about bodies: sick
bodies; healthy bodies; medicalized bodies; disabled bodies; reproductive
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bodies; dying bodies; dead bodies; and so on. The historical development
of medical sociology, however, has meant that it is only relatively recently,
thanks in no small part to the upsurge of interest in body matters both
inside and outside the academy, that the body has become an explicit topic
of discussion and debate. Feminists, perhaps, may object to any such
reading, pointing out that women’s struggle over bodies, particularly with
respect to medicine, predates these current corporeal concerns and
(malestream) preoccupations: our bodies, ourselves (Boston Women’s
Health Collective, 1973). Even here, however, ambivalence about bodies, if
not outright somatophobia or biophobia, has been evident within past
feminist scholarship and debate (Spelman, 1988): something, in keeping
with the broader corporeal trends, which is only now being redressed (see
for example Birke, 1999, 2003; Fausto-Sterling, 1992, 2000, 2003).
Two main strands of thinking on body matters, in keeping with broader
debates on the body in sociology today, are now evident in medical
sociology.
Social constructionism and the discursive body: Foucault and
beyond
Strands of social constructionist thought have of course been deployed for
many years in medical sociology, particularly within what one may term
‘conventional’ medicalization critiques (Conrad, 1992). The Foucauldian
legacy, however, has taken this much further through a new more thorough-
going medicalization critique in which former acknowledgement or accep-
tance of an underlying ‘natural’ or ‘bio-physical’ reality (and associated
notions such as the traditional disease–illness distinction) are cast in doubt
if not abandoned altogether. The body and disease, in this respect, become
(mere) discursive matters, the product that is to say of strategic, shifting,
historically contingent configurations of power/knowledge. The ‘solid’,
‘visible’ body, Foucault (1973: 3) famously proclaims in Birth of the Clinic,
‘is only one way – neither the first nor the most fundamental – in which
one spatializes disease. There have and will be other distributions of illness.’
It is not simply therefore, as Lupton (1997: 107) puts it, a question of:
stripping away medicine as a dominant frame of reference to reveal the ‘true’
body, as most orthodox critics would argue. From the Foucauldian perspective,
‘demedicalizing’ the body, or viewing it through alternative frames of reference
that are not medical, may well lead to different, but not more ‘authentic’ modes
of subjectivity or embodiment.
Foucault’s work, as this suggests, has been hugely influential within medical
sociology, providing a systematic approach to medical institutions, govern-
ment and the human body (Turner, 1995: 1). Through critical explorations
of the relationship between power/knowledge and the body, including the
‘anatamo-politics’ of the human body and the ‘bio-politics’ of the popu-
lation (Foucault, 1979), a number of important insights have emerged in
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medical sociology over the past two decades: insights, that is to say, concern-
ing the production, regulation and representation of bodies within the context
of disciplinary surveillance and the medical regimen (Turner, 1997: xv).
Armstrong, for example, himself a key exponent of the Foucauldian line
in medical sociology, has drawn attention to the various ways in which the
human body has been subjected to a:
. . . more complex, yet perhaps more efficient, machinery of power which, from
the moment of birth (or more correctly, from the time of registration at an ante-
natal clinic) to death, has constructed a web of investigation, observation and
reordering around individual bodies, their relationships and their subjectivity, in
the name of health. (1983: 112)
‘Surveillance Medicine’, moreover, it is claimed, has now eclipsed
‘Hospital Medicine’ (Armstrong, 1995): a transition symbolized, in the
current era of health promotion, by the strategic shift to a spatio-temporal
calculus of risk factors, crystallized in the moral pursuit or ‘imperative’ of
health (Lupton, 1997) through lifestyles and ‘care of the self’. The regu-
lation of bodies, in these and other ways, is now primarily achieved through
new forms of ‘governmentality’ – a regime that links self-subjection to
societal regulation (Turner, 1997: xv). While it may seem difficult, in short,
given these latter-day perspectives, to take a definitive stance on issues of
medicalization, awareness of these very difficulties, Lupton (1997: 108)
assures us, is itself an ‘important outcome that emerged from the entrée of
Foucauldian perspectives into the debate’.
Feminist writings on the body have also critically appropriated and
deployed these Foucauldian insights (Sawiki, 1991), highlighting the
construction and regulation of women’s bodies in and through medical
discourse and in various health care settings (Eckermann, 1997; Harding,
1997). This in turn has served to more or less thoroughly problematize
essentialist notions of the ‘sexed’ body, in medicine and elsewhere, thereby
providing important new opportunities for resistance through a feminist
body/politics in which bodies may be written if not lived differently
(Jacobus et al., 1990).
Other strands of postmodern thinking on health have taken this
Foucauldian message much further, opening up a series of more or less
promising new positions along the way. Nicholas Fox (1999), for example,
a forceful exponent of this postmodern stance in medical sociology,
condemns the modernist underpinnings of existing sociological and medical
approaches to the body, in sickness and in health. Postmodernism, he claims,
borrowing from the likes of Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari,
Cixous and others, promises to ‘open up’ the discourses which ‘fabricate’
our bodies and territorialize us, through various forms of disciplinary exper-
tise, in the name of health and illness. The discourses of medicine and its
‘collaborators’ within the modernist human sciences, it is claimed, seek to:
‘. . . territorialize us as “organisms” – bodies-with-organs (Deleuze and
health: 10(1)
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Guattari, 1984, 1989), doomed to face the ministrations of these disciplines
– to “health”, “beauty” to a “full and active life”, to patience in the face of
the failure of senses and memory, to accept, to be, never to become other’
(Fox, 1999: 6; emphasis in original). Biomedicine, in other words, constrains
and closes down other more promising options, possibilities, choices, render-
ing us, in effect, (fixed) bodies with organs vis-a-vis other more nomadic,
deterritorialized, postmodern forms of subjectivity and embodiment which,
Fox claims, take us ‘beyond’ health.
For all its promise and potential, however, a number of problems remain
with these positions. Perhaps the main problem here is that the world, and
the body and disease within it, becomes equated or conflated with our
discursive constructions, with ‘discovery’ traded for ‘fabrication’: a ‘writing
out’, in effect, through the very process of ‘writing in’. The construction of
what, therefore, remains largely unanswered; an impossible question to
answer, in fact, from this viewpoint. We may indeed go further, harking
back to a point raised in the introduction, and state that the body on offer
here, or perhaps more correctly the bodies on offer here (for there are as
many as we care to construct), are peculiar bodies indeed: disembodied,
disembowelled, disincarnated, dematerialized, deracinated, ethereal bodies,
based on a ‘surface’ theory that is only ‘skin deep’ (Birke, 1999). Construc-
tionists, of course, may reasonably retort that the ‘extra-discursive’ aspects
of bodies and the world they inhabit are not in fact denied. They can only
be known, however, through this or that discursive frame of reference or
configuration of power/knowledge. This is fair enough. All too often,
however, the slide from this perfectly reasonable, weaker claim, to stronger
endorsements of the constructionist line, proves tempting if not irresistible;
one in which the discursive and the extra-discursive are collapsed anew with
no attempt to theorise these issues both ways, so to speak. Our social
constructions aren’t quite as arbitrary as we care to think. Bodies surprise
us, they betray us in all sorts of ways that render our constructions of them
problematic: it’s two-way traffic in short, with many surprises en route (see
also Murphy’s [2002] two-way musings on these relations).2
A further paradox arises here, namely that is only by virtue of our evolved
biological capacities for tool and language use that constructionists are able
to deny or downplay the biological as little more than a fabrication: self-
deception or self-deceit indeed. What this amounts to, in the final analysis,
is not so much the overcoming of biological reductionism, as its inversion
through a new form of reductionism or ‘discourse determinism’ in which
all is reduced to the social, qua power/knowledge. In doing so, the biologi-
cal is itself written out or rendered unimportant, except as yet another
(‘rival’) body of power/knowledge. An infinite regress results therefore
which has us all precariously perched if not falling into the ‘abyss of rela-
tivism’, given the absence of any independent court of appeal or grounds
upon which to arbitrate between different knowledge claims or versions of
reality (Bury, 1986).
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The lived body: phenomenology and beyond
Here we arrive at the second main way in which the body is evident in
medical sociology today, namely through a more fully embodied perspec-
tive on matters of health and illness which lays the Cartesian ghost of
mind–body dualism to rest once and for all. The emphasis here, again
echoing broader debates within the sociology of the body, is on the moving,
thinking, feeling, pulsing, body; the lived body as a mindful, intentional site
of on-going experience, a spontaneous synthesis of powers, and the very
basis of our being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). This is an approach,
as Leder puts it, which does not so much replace the biological account, as
place it within a ‘broader perspective’. The:
Anatomy and physiology of the lived body are always intertwined with the body’s
intentionality in ways that undermine facile claims of priority. Just as our physical
structure lays the groundwork for our mode of being-in-the-world, so our inter-
actions with this world fold back to reshape our body in ways conducive to health
and illness. A medicine of the lived body dwells in this intertwining. (1998: 125)
It is still all too easy, of course, to miss, neglect or downplay this inter-
twining, even when researching the lived body. A variety of studies may be
pointed to, nonetheless, which do indeed dwell on/in this intertwining.
Freund’s (1990) work, for example, is instructive here on a number of
counts. The emotionally ‘expressive’ body, he argues, provides a ‘common
ground’ for the sociology of emotions and the sociology of health and
illness. In particular, this helps us understand more clearly how social struc-
ture affects health deep within the recesses of the human body. Differing
modes of emotional being, in effect, are differing ways of feeling empow-
ered or disempowered; feelings very much linked to people’s conditions of
existence throughout their embodied biographies. It is here at this
embodied nexus, Freund argues, that:
‘External’ social structural factors such as one’s position in different systems of
hierarchy or various forms of social control can influence the conditions of our
existence, how we respond and apprehend these conditions of existence and our
sense of embodied self. These conditions can also affect our physical function-
ing. (1990: 461)
The argument here then is for a subtle and sophisticated form of socially
‘pliable’ biology, which accords existential modes of being a central role in
linking the health and illness of the embodied agent with wider structures
of power and domination, civilization and control. In doing so, moreover,
some promising links are provided with broader agendas concerning
inequalities in health, particularly work on the ‘socio-biological translation’
(Tarlov, 1996; Wilkinson, 1996) and on-going research in the life-events and
illness paradigm (Brown and Harris, 1989) – see also Dickens (2000) on
how capital is modifying human biology in its own image, and Blaxter (2003)
on the ‘synthesis’ of biology, social class and inequalities in health through
‘health capital’.
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Monaghan (2003), in contrast, takes a somewhat different line, highlight-
ing ethnoscientific understandings and social constructions of the supposed
bodybuilding, steroids and violence connection; accounts that challenge yet
incorporate arguments concerning steroid, mood and behavioural effects.
Rather than writing the biological cum hormonal body out, Monaghan
shows, these ethno scientific accounts underscore the social significance of
biology and bodily health once they are conceptualized in non-reductionist
terms. Respondents endeavouring to build ‘better’ physical bodies, in this
respect, offered a ‘coherent and integrated account of the ways in which
“male” sex hormones may be implicated in the social in non-determinate
ways’ (2003: 155). Finding a place for the biological, in short, was relatively
unproblematic for these respondents; one shorn of reductionist baggage
and media hype concerning the supposed ‘roid-rage connection’.
The sociology of chronic illness has also benefited enormously from a
fuller engagement with embodiment in recent years. Although not explic-
itly excluded, the body has nonetheless remained ‘theoretically elusive’ in
much of this past literature, as Kelly and Field (1996: 243) note, constantly
gliding out of view through an overemphasis on ‘meaning’ at the expense
of the ‘restrictions and discomforts of illness and disability’. The call there-
fore is not simply for an approach to the study of chronic illness which
explicitly focuses on the body, but one which incorporates both social and
biological facts in doing so. Bodies, it is only too apparent,‘change in chronic
illness’. Chronic illness also involves ‘changes in self-capacities which are
reciprocal to bodily experiences, feelings and actions’ (1996: 247; emphasis
in original). The body, it follows, is central here because ‘the biological bases
of experience as perceived by self and others have very important effects
on the construction of self and identity’ (1996: 248). The relationship
between self and identity, in other words, is a ‘social process which alters
through time, as the bodily contingencies change’ (1996: 248–9). Biological
and physical facts, in short, are sociologically significant because: ‘a) they
impinge directly on the self; b) they provide signals for identity construc-
tion, and; c) they act as limiting factors for the sufferer’ (1996: 251) – see
also Millward and Kelly (2003) on relations between body, self and the
material world.
Other work on issues such as pain and emotion (Leder, 1990; Williams
and Bendelow, 1998), and illness narratives (Kleinman, 1988) raise similar
embodied themes and corporeal concerns. Frank (1996: 58), for example,
notes how odd the idea of body as ‘surface’ or ‘text’ is for someone who
suffers from cancer: illness, he states, means living with the body, experi-
encing it through a ‘shifting synthesis of this perpetually spiralling dialec-
tic of flesh, inscription and intention’ (see also Frank, 1995). ‘Culture’, from
this viewpoint, fills the existential space between the ‘immediate embodi-
ment of sickness as physiological process and its mediated (therefore
meaning-laden) experience as human phenomenon – for example, as an
alienated part of body-self, as a vehicle of transcendence, or as a source of
Williams: Medical Sociology and the Biological Body
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embarrassment or grief’ (Kleinman, 1988: 27). These insights, in turn, are
augmented through Turner and Wainwright’s (2003) recent embodied
insights into the injured ballet dancer. Through a phenomenological under-
standing of the experiences of embodiment, these authors observe how
injury and pain disrupt the practical accomplishments that underpin the
ballet habitus and the dancer’s identity. These very injuries, however, are
themselves mediated through the social bonding of dancers into a
professional ballet company, or corps de ballet, where injury is accepted as
a sign of vocational commitment. A comprehensive account of injury
amongst ballet dancers, therefore, would have to address: ‘both the insti-
tutional and social settings of injury that construct the conditions under
which injury is possible, and the embodiment of ballet practice that consti-
tute the habitus of ballet . . . major injury, such as a broken toe or damaged
knee, can obviously terminate the career of a professional dancer at any
point of time, but the translation of minor troubles into a serious injury is
filtered through the social body of the dancers’ (2003: 285).
Echoes of this viewpoint are increasingly evident in other recent attempts
to bring impairment back into the disability debate. As writers such as
Thomas (2002) argues, the social model of disability has been tremendously
important in helping challenge the idea that the problems disabled people
face are the inevitable, ‘tragic’ consequences of having impaired bodies. At
one and the same time, however, this stance neglects the sometimes diffi-
cult realities of living with impairment: the ‘eclipsing’ of impairment, in
effect, if not a mutual disengagement between disability studies and the
sociology of the body (Hughes and Paterson, 1997). Disabled feminists in
particular, Thomas notes, have been at the forefront of bringing the body
in by drawing attention to impairment, thereby challenging the social model
in which such matters are analytically left aside (see for example Crow,
1996; Wendell, 1996). A sociology of impairment, in this respect:
. . . needs to be able to engage with the real materiality of bodies whilst at the
same time understanding the ways in which bodies are simultaneously always
interpreted. Those of us who live with marked impairments know that the body
is ‘real’ however thoroughly it is culturally represented and positioned. (Thomas,
2002: 77)
Shakespeare and Erickson (2000: 195) reach similar conclusions, stressing
the need for a model that takes proper account of ‘both the personal and
physical experience of disability, and the social dimensions’. ‘It needs too,’
they continue, ‘to recognise the importance of psychological processes and
the cultural patterns and representations which influence the way we think
about disabled people as disabled people.’ These four, inextricably
entwined dimensions, it is argued, ‘produce the disability phenomenon
which millions of people experience every day’. Zola’s (1982, 1991) work
too is another exemplar here, given his willingness to explore disability from
many viewpoints, thereby attempting to link the material, social and cultural
health: 10(1)
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dimensions of disability in doing so. Processes of ageing moreover, Zola
stressed, were something that linked the interests of the ‘able-bodied’ to
those of the ‘disabled’. The ‘ontological reality of the impaired body’, in
short, from this perspective, is ‘central to the development of any social
theory of disability’ (Williams and Busby, 2000: 182) – see also Freund’s
(2001) recent work on bodies, disability and spaces.
As for sociological work on death and dying, a more explicit engagement
with the body has again been apparent here in recent years in various guises.
Lawton’s (2000) work on ‘dirty’ dying in the hospice, for instance, is a case
in point, providing a graphic account of the corporeal dilemmas which
particular types of dying pose. Her analysis in this respect, underlining the
foregoing embodied themes, highlights the importance of focusing upon the
‘real’ body of the patient and the disease processes taking place within it
and upon its surfaces – processes which, quite literally, led to the loss of
bodily boundaries through the ravages of terminal cancer – in order to
understand why some patients are sequestered within the hospice whereas
others are not. By making the ‘non-negotiable’ deterioration of bodies of
dying patients a central point of analysis, therefore, Lawton (2000: 3) reveals
how the capacity for mobility and for corporeal ‘self-containment’ are
‘absolutely fundamental to selfhood in the modern “western” context’. In
order for selfhood to be realized and maintained in contemporary society,
in short, ‘certain specific bodily capacities and attributes must be possessed:
the most important being a bounded, enclosed body’ (2000: 7).
What then of future agendas?
Where do we go from here: back to the future?
Despite these promising developments, much remains to be done, not
simply in bringing the body back in (mission more or less accomplished),
but in more explicitly addressing, debating, incorporating and theorizing
the biological in doing so: a going beyond the biological, we might say,
without leaving it out altogether. We are, in other words, at an early stage
in this emerging or evolving ‘material-corporeal’ project, which attempts to
‘marry’ the biological and the social in a ‘truly’ embodied fashion (Newton,
2003a). A return to some basic (underlying or under-labouring) points,
premises and principles may be useful therefore at this juncture, as a spring-
board to future discussion and debate.
Perhaps the first issue here is what, precisely, we mean by biology? This,
to be sure, is a tricky issue. Biology, for example, may be viewed as both a
set of living processes and animating principles (i.e. the biological or biolog-
ica), and a subject of scientific study (i.e. biology qua discipline); the former
an ontological matter, the latter an epistemological matter, with complex
relations between the two. Questions of the relationship between nature,
biology and genetics complicate the picture further: itself requiring a fuller
more systematic treatment in another paper. At the very least, I suggest,
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recourse to the biological (in the former sense), brings into play related
issues to do with the materiality of organisms or bodies, and the ‘brute’
physical facts if not the fleshy dilemmas of our mortal existence.
There are, without doubt, many good reasons for past sociological distrust
or scepticism regarding biology, in whatever guise. The biologisms of the
recent past, for instance, could all be roundly condemned: ‘philosophically,
because they violated the logical distinction between facts and values; scien-
tifically, because the genetic differences on the distribution of mental and
moral traits among individuals and races appeared insignificant; and
morally, because of the cruelties committed in their name’ (Kaye, 1986: 2).
Recourse to the biological, it seems, has all too often served dubious ends:
called upon to legitimate inequalities and to limit freedom, particularly
those of women, children and other ‘marginalized’ groups. So why invoke
the biological? Surely social and cultural change outstrips biological evolu-
tion by far? Perhaps, but that in itself does not challenge the belief proposed
by many advocates of neo-Darwinism, that any processes of social evolu-
tion are nonetheless constrained by earlier processes of biological evolu-
tion; a view linked to growing fascination with genetics, which has
resurfaced in the popular guise of evolutionary psychology (EP). The
dangers of a ‘genes-eye’ view of the world are all too apparent here, in
keeping with other forms of reductionist thinking, both past and present
(Higgs and Jones, 2003; Rose and Rose, 2000).
What is needed then, is not a retreat into former dualisms, nor a slide
into any assimilation of sociology to biology or vice versa, but of (re)newed
dialogue and debate of a more explicit kind. We need to recover or develop
(new) non-reductionist ways of envisaging these relations in an attempt to
go beyond any such yo-yo logic or either/or debate. On the one hand, to
repeat, there are many promising signs here already, in medical sociology
and beyond (see for example Benton, 1991, 2003; Birke, 1999, 2003; Dickens,
2000; Freese et al., 2003; Goldman and Schurman, 2000; Pirani and Varga,
2005),3 not least, as we have seen, through recourse to issues of embodi-
ment. On the other hand, to pronounce the problem solved is at best prema-
ture and at worst naïve, given the many unresolved issues and important
challenges ahead (of which more later).
A realist perspective, I venture, has much to offer here as an under-
labouring philosophy, helping us rethink the complexity of the world, and
the biological and social relations contained therein, through non-reduc-
tionist principles of irreducibility and emergence conceived in ‘open
systems’. In doing so, moreover, not only is a robust defence mounted of
structure–agency relationship and dynamics, but a ‘weak’ version of
constructionism may also be readily accommodated, endorsed or incorpor-
ated; one that refuses to conflate ontological and epistemological matters
(i.e. what we know and how we know it with what there is to know) (see
for example, Archer et al., 1998; Sayer, 2000; Williams, 2003a). Shilling
(2005), for example, in his own more recent writing on the body, proposes
health: 10(1)
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what he terms an explicit version of corporeal realism. Corporeal realism,
it is argued, is distinct from its realist counterparts in as much as it treats
the body–society relationship as its core problematic. At one and the same
time, it is based on long-standing realist concepts concerning: (1) the onto-
logically stratified nature of the relationship between the social forces
shaping society and the people who inhabit society; (2) the need for a
temporal dimension to social analysis which enables the analysis of inter-
action over time of the generative properties of the body and the constrain-
ing forces of society in a non-reductionist or irreducible fashion; and (3)
the potentially critical dimension of this form of social analysis or inquiry
(2005: 12). The case, in short, for recognizing the body as an emergent,
socially generative phenomenon is crucial or critical to this particular form
of corporeal realism. The embodied subject, moreover, in keeping with
realist commitments to irreducibility and emergence, is possessed not
simply of physical attributes, important as they are, but of ‘feelings,
dispositions and embodied consciousness which emerges through evolution
and development as an organism and which together enable humans to
intervene and make a difference to their environment, to exercise agency’
(2005: 13).
To this we may add a series of further important points which any such
rethinking of the biological might profitably entertain, including an
acknowledgement of biological enablements as well as constraints; a fuller,
more subtle and nuanced account of the processual, dynamic, developmental
nature of our lifelines, qua human organisms and embodied agents, involv-
ing the interplay of specificity and plasticity, being and becoming (Rose,
1997); and a recognition of the critical potential of the biological in exposing
rather than legitimating oppressive social practices (helping us, in other
words, to say what oppressive social practices are oppressive of and do
damage to [Nussbaum, 1992; Sayer, 2000]).4 It may, indeed, be useful here
to deconstruct the apparent unity of ‘biology’ as a disciplinary matrix and
to think instead in terms of anatomy, physiology, neurobiology, endocrinol-
ogy, genetics and so on, thereby reducing the risk of simplistic resolutions
or realignments of biology and sociology.5 It is insights such as this, I
venture, which may go some way toward giving the biological that albeit
cautious welcome back in, which Benton (1991) called for over a decade
ago now. It may also, as Birke (1999) comments, encourage us to delve more
deeply ‘into’ bodies and their interior spaces, rather than remaining on the
‘outside’ or on the ‘surface’ (see, for example, Haraway, 1991, 1997;6 Martin,
1987, 1994). Realism, in short, if not corporeal realism or corporealism, has
much to offer here.7 It also, to repeat, is compatible with a weak version of
constructionism, or a radical realist version of constructionism if you prefer;
a realist constructionism perhaps (Murphy, 2002).8
Medical sociology, to repeat, is (already) well placed to take up these
challenges and carry these agendas forward in a variety of ways, from the
role of biological and social factors in the ‘afflictions’ of health inequalities,
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to the vicissitudes of chronic illness, pain, disability, death and dying. Prof-
itable intersections with debates in related fields such as the sociology of
childhood (James et al., 2000; Mayall, 2002; Williams and Bendelow, 2003)
and the sociology of ageing (Bury, 2000; Bury and Wadsworth, 2003;
Williams, 2003b) underline these issues, as do other new domains of inquiry
such as the sociology of sleep (Williams, 2002, 2003c, 2005). It is only by
recognizing the ‘ontological vulnerability’ of the human body, including the
‘tragic consequences of chronicity, impairment and disease’, as Turner
(2003: 280–1) rightly notes, that the social sciences can understand and
contribute to the study of social suffering. In this way, he concludes, biology,
via a ‘secular theodicy’ (i.e. problems of suffering and injustice) can ‘usefully
enter, or re-enter, the social sciences’ (see also Turner and Rojek, 2001).
It is not simply a question, however, returning to the different aspects
or dimensions of biology raised above, of rethinking biological factors,
conceived as living animating processes and principles, but of rethinking
the very relationship between sociology and the biological sciences them-
selves in doing so. The idea, as Bury (1997: 199) rightly comments, that
such disciplines are only ‘one way of understanding reality’, discursive
‘fabrications’ or ‘ideological edifices’, ‘underestimates the issues at stake
and detracts from serious analysis’. If the body is to be invoked in socio-
logical enquiry, he continues, and especially if (medical) sociology wishes
to come to terms with ‘corporeal realities’, then ‘the place of the biologi-
cal sciences (as well as the biological dimensions of experience) has to be
more clearly appreciated’ (1997: 199–200). The state of the biological
sciences, Benton reminds us, is ‘fluid, there are numerous competing
conceptualisations within biology, and there are several well-articulated
alternatives to reductionist materialism available for use as philosophical
means in the attempt to re-think the biology/society relationship’ (1991: 18,
emphasis added).
This is a call in effect, in the face of various (reductionist) brands or
stands of sociologism, for a more ‘mature’ or ‘balanced’ form of sociologi-
cal theorizing which recognizes the limits of our own knowledge (Craib,
1997; Williams, 2001, 2003b), while simultaneously acknowledging that
other disciplines such as biology (or perhaps more correctly certain strands
of non-reductionist thinking within it), do indeed have some important
things to say about the world and our place within it. The constructionist
tendency or temptation to turn other bodies of knowledge into mere ‘fabri-
cations’ or objects of sociological scrutiny, critique or contempt, is thereby
tempered, without abandoning it altogether. A weak form of construction-
ism, to repeat, has a place and is compatible with realist principles. Medical
sociology, for instance, should indeed be able to challenge the biomedical
monopoly over knowledge about the body, but superficial critiques – which
throw the baby out with the bathwater – will not do. This is a position, in
other words, which in no way trades our hard-won gains, or negates a robust
defence of informed sociological critiques.
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Developments within the biological and medical sciences presage these
issues in critical new ways through (global) processes of bio-medicalization
and the like (Clarke et al., 2000, 2003). The new genetics (Conrad and Gabe,
1999), for example, not least ‘reproductive genetics’ (Ettorre, 1999), is
raising a host of challenging new questions about what we take ‘life’ to be,
what it is to be human, what ‘counts’ as the body, and where these and other
limits lie (Katz Rothman, 1998). The implications of this in terms of
relations between the body, identity and risk, including the impact of genetic
knowledge on professional and lay views of chronic illness and disability,
and its future role in the public’s health, are also now very much on the
agenda (see, for example, Kerr and Shakespeare, 2002; Petersen and
Bunton, 2002; Shakespeare, 2003). These and other developments, in the
era of bio-technology cum bio-capitalism, bio-prospecting, bio-patenting or
bio-piracy (Scheper-Hughes and Wacquant, 2001), call it what you will,
demand and necessitate a rethinking of relations between the biological
and social sciences in ways which take us far beyond reductionism, whilst
simultaneously tackling head on the social, ethical and political dilemmas
this Brave New World of ‘posthuman’ (?) (Fukuyama, 2002) possibilities
throws up: a process, as Clarke et al. appositely put it, with ‘Western roots’
and ‘global rhizomes’ – see also Frank’s (2003) musings on alternative
claims of posthuman futures.
This, however, is not the end of the story. Rethinking the biological also,
of course, raises a series of red/green agendas concerning ecology and health,
which extend far beyond the traditional remit or confines of medical soci-
ology (Benton, 1991). Denying our evolutionary kinship and commonalities
with other species, and our ecological responsibilities and interdependen-
cies with other ‘living and non-living forces and processes’, from this view-
point, is indeed unwarranted and unnecessary. One outcome of rethinking
issues this way, as Benton (2003: 292) elegantly puts it, is to theorize social
relations ‘not simply as relations between social actors’, but also as:
relations between human social actors and elements of non-human nature:
physical objects and forces, artefacts, chemical substances, populations of culti-
vated, domesticated and wild varieties of species of non-human animals and
plants, spatial envelopes, land and ecosystems, both modified and unmodified by
past human activity, and so on. (See also Franklin, 2001; McLaughlin, 2001;
Macnaghten and Urry, 2001; Murphy, 2002; Soper, 1995)
Rethinking biology in this way, to summarize, opens up a range of import-
ant, timely and topical issues that carry us from the dilemmas of embodi-
ment, enselfment and emplacement (Turner, 2003), with or without the aid
of the latest bio-technology cum bio-medicalization in the global era
(Clarke et al., 2000, 2003; Turner, 2004), to the environmental, ecological
and global agendas of the 21st century (Benton, 2003; Goldman and
Schurman, 2000; York et al., 2003); themselves the site of collective as well
as individual struggle and resistance.
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The (un)knowable body: a further stumbling block?
A number of problems and challenges remain, nonetheless, both theoreti-
cal and methodological, in any such project or undertaking. It is still very
difficult, for example, as Newton (2003a) has recently commented, to ‘know’
or interrogate the biological dimensions of the body, at least with the
conventional sociological toolkit.9 Many biological processes indeed remain
unknown to us at the lived, embodied level (though the unconscious body,
of course, ‘knows’ them only too well). There is ‘no easy way to “know” the
biological body’, in other words, or to ‘know how it relates to the social’
(Newton, 2003a: 31–2). The differential temporal pace of biological and
social processes, moreover, raises further problems. ‘Culture, psyche and
soma’ in this respect remain ‘intertwined’, yet ‘biological and social aspects
of the body also represent the interweaving of different timescapes’. In
trying to ‘grapple’ sociologically with the body therefore, Newton concludes,
one is confronted with the difficulty of ‘deriving a common epistemology
across differing timescapes’ (2003b: 450).
Does this then return us to something like a (back door) dualist position?
Not necessarily. It is indeed quite possible, echoing Newton (2003b), to take
an anti-dualist stance here that nonetheless acknowledges relative differ-
ences, if not divisions of this very kind. Acknowledging difference, in other
words, is compatible or congruent with an anti-dualist position, though it
may very well lead us to question an uncritical or unqualified commitment
to, or endorsement of, narratives of ‘wholeness’ (Newton, 2003b: 434). Once
you begin see the biological itself as a complex, multi-layered domain,
moreover, there is the prospect of seeing patterns of similarities and differ-
ences between different domains (and the study of them) which do not all
coincide with the ‘biological’–‘social’ boundary or division.10
A return to the intellectual division of labour is also instructive at this
point. Faced with these ‘residual’ problems, tensions and difficulties,
Newton (2003a) suggests, material-corporeal sociologists may well have to
learn some basic biology if they are truly to tackle these problems and
move these agendas forward in profitable/productive ways. This may or
may not be the case, particularly when charges of ‘imperialism’ are (rightly
or wrongly) weighed in the balance. Either way, to repeat, the taking of a
non-reductionist, irreducible position on these matters ensures that a
robust defence of sociology is still possible. Calls for trans- or post-
disciplinarity, in this respect, within or beyond the social sciences, may well
be premature – see, for example, McLennan (2003) who endorses a limited
form of trans-disciplinarity rather than post-disciplinarity – but this in no
way precludes or prohibits the exploitation of profitable (problem-
centred) bridgeheads as and where necessary or appropriate. As for
consideration of the relationship between these specific issues, and broader
questions of sociology’s complexity (McLennan, 2003), I will leave that for
others to debate.
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All in all, to summarize, we are clearly at an early stage in these develop-
ments, but we should not underestimate the challenges ahead if we are to
achieve a ‘truly’ embodied sociology of the material-corporeal or corpo-
realist kind, in health as elsewhere. Newton’s comments and cautionary
remarks, in this respect, are timely and topical, but in truth simply reinforce
what most material corporeal sociologists already know and are actively
grappling with; namely, that relations between the biological and the social
are indeed complex, and that we need therefore to tread warily in this
contested terrain, preparing ourselves for what would could in fact be a
long journey, with many traps for the unwary en route.
‘Translating’ the matter? Realizing the body in (medical)
practice
There is at least one further way forward here, however, in relation to the
foregoing theme and issues, one only hinted at so far in the article. I am
referring of course to what may loosely be termed the sociology of trans-
lation. Inspired by Latour (1993) and other like-minded thinkers within
science and technology studies, this an ‘impure’ approach that effectively
dispenses with sharp, clear-cut, neat and tidy modernist distinctions or
division of the nature–culture kind in favour of a more mixed or hybrid
view of the world. This is an approach, Prout (2000) comments, which
remains both constructionist and materialist through its emphasis on
hybridity and heterogeneity; a world which is produced in and through
densely patterned networks of shifting associations and dissociations made
up of a wide variety of human and non-human entities or ‘quasi-objects’
and ‘quasi-subjects’. Analysis therefore concerns the ‘translation’ or
networks of mediation between these different entities, all of which are
treated as a priori equal or symmetrical actants, hence the other often-cited
term for this approach, namely, actor network theory.
These ideas, for example, have recently been taken up to good effect
within the sociology of childhood. Childhoods and bodies, in this respect,
are placed in relation:
not only to symbolic but also material culture. What produces them is not simply
biological events, not only the phenomenology of bodily experience, and not
merely structures and symbols of discursive meaning – although all of these are
important – but also patterns of material organization and their modes of order.
(Prout, 2000: 15)
Examining childhood bodies therefore, from this perspective, becomes a
matter of ‘tracing through the means, the varied array of materials and prac-
tices involved in their construction and maintenance – and in some circum-
stances their unravelling and disintegration’ (Prout, 2000: 15, emphasis
added).
Place (2000), for instance, in a fascinating study of childhood bodies in a
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paediatric intensive care unit (PICU), shows how what is natural and what
is social becomes hopelessly blurred in such settings. The definition of what
precisely the corporeal elements of the (critically ill) child’s body are, in
other words, is very much open to negotiation here, given the manifold
attachments of non-corporeal, technological elements vital for the child’s
survival, including processes of ‘techno-dressing’, which involve cannula-
tion, intubation, catheterization and the placing of artefacts both inside and
on the surface of the corporeal body: a ‘socio-technological imbroglio’, in
effect. The contesting of such bodily boundaries, therefore, raises import-
ant questions as to the ‘natural’ status of children’s bodies, redirecting atten-
tion instead to the notion that heterogeneity or hybridity is the norm or
rule, including the mutual enrolment of the corporeal, the technological and
the figurative (Place, 2000; Prout, 2000).
Another interesting variant on these themes is to be found in Mol’s
(2002) recent work on the ‘body multiple’ and the enactment of ontology
in medical practice: a theoretically informed ethnography, to be more
precise, of the diagnosis and treatment of atherosclerosis in a Dutch
University Hospital, but with far wider implications for the issues raised
in this article. Practice, indeed, is foregrounded here in a radical fashion.
Again this represents another important shift away from the limits of
constructionism or perspectivism, and the privileging of epistemological
matters, to an inquiry focused squarely on the ways in which objects are
enacted in practices (that is knowledge as a matter of manipulation rather
than representation). It is not, in other words, a question here of different
perspectives on the body and disease, or how medicine knows its objects,
but of how medicine ‘attunes to, interacts with, and shapes its objects’ in
and through its ‘various and varied practices’ (2002: vii). Ontologies, from
this perspective, are far from transcendent. They are instead brought about
or brought into being in practice. ‘Reality’, we are told, ‘does not precede
practices, but is part of them’ (2002; 6; emphases in original). In practice,
nonetheless, Mol argues, the body and its diseases are ‘more than one’, but
without being fragmented into being many: a situation she tries to capture
through the combination of a singular noun and a plural adjective, namely,
the ‘body multiple’ – see also Mol and Law (2004). If practices are fore-
grounded in this way, in short:
. . . there is no longer a single passive object in the middle, waiting to be seen from
the point of view of a seemingly endless series of perspectives. Instead objects
come into being – and disappear – with the practices in which they are manipu-
lated. And since the object of manipulation tends to differ from one practice to
another, reality multiplies. The body, the patient, the disease, the doctor, the tech-
nician, the technology: all of these are more than one. More than singular. For
even if objects differ from one practice to another, there are relations between
these practices. Thus, far from necessarily falling into fragments, multiple objects
tend to hang together somehow. Attending to the multiplicity of reality opens up
the possibility of studying this remarkable achievement. (2002: 5)
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This ‘praxiographic’ approach, therefore, in keeping with the sociology of
translation, requires us to take objects and events of all kinds into consider-
ation: ‘No phenomenon’, indeed, ‘can be ignored on the grounds that it
belongs to another discipline’ (Mol, 2002: 159). In a world where ontology
is accepted to be multiple, realized quite literally in and through practice,
the key question is ‘what is being done, and what, in doing so, is reality in
practice made to be’ (2002: 159–60, emphasis added). This in turn becomes
a political matter: a politics of what that ‘includes ontology rather than
presuming it’ (2002: 184). If we hold to this notion that knowledge is
primarily about ‘partaking in a reality’, moreover, then our understanding
of relations between the sciences also ‘begins to shift’:
For whatever the relations between objects hidden inside the body – athero-
sclerotic plaque, peak flow velocity, increased cholesterol level – the practices in
which these objects exist are concerned a lot more with expensive or cheap
apparatus, blood or flesh, forms or conversations, work hours, self-esteem,
insurance schemes. Treatment decisions are informed by the length of a stenosis
and the length of hospital stay. In practice, such diverse phenomena do not belong
to different orders. It makes no sense to delegate them to separate layers of reality.
They are all relevant and somehow have to be reckoned with together. What
different sciences have to offer practice is different points of leverage, different
techniques of intervention, and, indeed, different methods. One specialism has
dyes at its disposal, another knives, and a third the technique of humming, but
in hospital practice they must somehow align and coordinate their objects. (2002:
154–5, emphasis added)
The sociology of translation and its ‘offshoots’ then, to summarise,
provides another significant advance on a purely constructionist or repre-
sentational approach to the body, or a purely anything approach for that
matter; an ‘impure’ approach, to repeat, given the ‘hybrid’, material and
cultural, human and non-human, world we live in. To the extent that socio-
material practices are privileged or foregrounded in this way, moreover, we
are powerfully reminded that reality is, in no small part or measure, an
enacted matter (for example, ontology in practice). Perhaps most impor-
tantly, for our purposes, the implications of Mol’s analysis, both in this text
and her subsequent collaborative work (Mol and Law, 2004), seems to
suggest that the ‘coherence’ of the body itself, or the way in which it ‘hangs
together’, is far from axiomatic or self-evident. It is instead an on-going
accomplishment or practical achievement: something, that is to say, that the
embodied person needs to do.
Problems remain nonetheless. The commitment within the sociology of
translation to treating all human–non-human entities (or quasi-objects and
quasi-subjects) as a priori equal or symmetrical actants, for example, is
contentious to say the least. A nagging doubt also remains as to whether
or not Mol overstates the case for multiplicity and the degree to which, as
a corollary, the body and disease ‘hang together’ or ‘cohere’ through
practice (that is ‘coherence’ as a practical accomplishment). Does Mol’s
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emphasis on the enacted nature of reality in practice, moreover, laudable
as it is, leave adequate room or grounding for the abiding nature of reality
between or over and above any such practices? – see also Grosz (1994) for
a similar concern with Butler’s emphasis on performance; a term which Mol
(2002: 41), admittedly, seeks to distance herself from. Here of course we
return to the thorny question of whether or not ontologies are transcen-
dent or brought about in practice. But we had better stop there.
Conclusion
Let me take this opportunity to restate here the central arguments upon
which this article rests. If medical sociology, in keeping with the sociology
of the body, is truly to face up to and work through the ‘corporeal realities’
of the body, emphasis on corporeal realities (Bury, 1997; Shilling, 2005), then
it must at the very least entertain if not fully incorporate the biological –
as both a living set of animating forces and principles and a (legitimate)
disciplinary form of knowledge – into its theorizing in ways we are only
now beginning to profitably grapple with and address. This, to repeat, is not
a call for reductionist thinking of any kind, sociological, biological or other-
wise; we have had far too much of that already. Strong versions of construc-
tionist thinking, on this count, are found wanting, like their biologically
reductionist counterparts. Nor is it an attempt to dilute or detract from the
hard-won gains and intellectual achievements of our discipline. It is instead,
a call for new forms of thinking and new ways of theorizing these relations
in non-reductionist, non-determinist terms which lay to rest the false starts
and problems of the past in a spirit of renewed dialogue and debate. The
article, in this respect, is part and parcel of a newly emerging ‘material-
corporeal’ (Newton, 2003a) project in sociology today. Realism, I have
argued, has much to offer here as an under-labouring philosophy, particu-
larly recent strands of corporeal realism (Shilling, 2005). So too does
the sociology of translation, given its hybrid vision of the world based on
the mutual enrolment or imbrication of the material and the cultural, the
corporeal and the technological, the human and the non-human. The shift
away from constructionism to the enactment of reality in and through socio-
material practices, including the doing of the body as a practical accom-
plishment, adds further important insights and dimensions to this newly
emerging corpus of work. My preference, however, to repeat, is for a
straightforward material–corporeal version of realism of the kind eluci-
dated, embodied or fleshed out above.
Medical sociology, it is clear, is well placed to address these issues. There
are indeed, as we have seen, many promising signs here already, including
recent studies in this material–corporeal vein on the expressive body, chronic
illness, pain, disability, sleep, death and dying, alongside other recent work
on the ‘body multiple’ and the enactment of (medical) reality in practice.
Developments in biomedicine, bioscience and biotechnology, it has been
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argued, together with a series of red/green agendas concerning the political
ecology as well as the political economy of health in the global era, presage
these issues in critical new ways, demanding and necessitating a rethinking
of biology–society relations. Whether or not this requires something akin to
a ‘new’ medical sociology of course is a moot point. Certainly, as Turner
(2004: 271) rightly argues, there is a need for a more comprehensive and
sophisticated understanding of health and illness in the global era which
recognizes that the ‘major economic processes of modern society are
concerned with the production of health through the pharmaceutical
industry, research and development genetics, the integration of microbiol-
ogy and information science, and the management of life processes, such as
reproduction, ageing, and death’. Medicine, in this respect, is now a major
component of the ‘global economy’ based on the ‘production, reproduction,
and the management of the human body’ (2004: 272).
Herein lies a third conclusion then, namely, that it is not simply a question
of what the sociology of the body can do for medical sociology but of what
medical sociology, ‘new’ or ‘old’, can do for the sociology of the body.
Medical sociology, as Bury (1997) comments, is not simply a means of illus-
trating sociological debates about the body and society, though it can of
course do this quite successfully, but of evaluating them, contributing
important new insights along the way. To the extent indeed that medical
sociology is grounded or immersed in the existentially charged, morally
laden, fleshy dilemmas and embodied predicaments of health and illness,
pain and sickness, disease and disability, life and death, and to the extent
that developments in biomedicine, bioscience and biotechnology constitute
a critical point of sociological commentary or inquiry, then it may very well
prove to be a ‘leading edge’, if not the leading edge (Turner, 1992), of
contemporary theorizing about the body and society in a changing world.
A ‘new’ medical sociology, moreover, which examines how macro processes
of globalization, risk, economic deregulation and technological change
shape and connect to personal embodied experiences of health and illness
has much to offer both now and in the future (Turner, 2004).
This may all sound very promising – indeed it is – but important theor-
etical and methodological challenges still lie ahead and much remains to
be done here on this material–corporeal front, not least, as I have already
indicated, in terms of ‘knowing’ the (biological) body and in facing up to
the complexity of relations between the biological and the social this entails,
including their differential timescapes (Newton, 2003a, 2003b). Acknowl-
edgement of important differences between biological and social process is
still nonetheless, to repeat, congruent with an anti-dualist position on these
matters. We are, to conclude, at an early stage in these developments and
debates. Bringing the biological body back into our analysis, however, is no
mere intellectual exercise. It is instead something that implicates us all, not
simply as academics of this or that persuasion, but as embodied human
beings, biologically vulnerable ones at that, with rights and responsibilities,
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both individual and collective in kind. The stakes are high. We neglect them
at our peril.
Notes
1. Although mindful of these terminological issues and the history underpinning
them, I will stick with the term ‘medical sociology’ throughout for the sake of
consistency in this particular article.
2. ‘Pristine’ nature, Murphy (2002) argues, has been replaced by socially
encompassed ‘primal’ nature, which retains its capacity for independent
dynamics that affect social constructions. Technology socially constructed by
humans, moreover, consists of a recombination of substances and processes
created by nature’s forces. Nature, nonetheless, can ‘still surprise us’, ‘bite back’
or ‘escape our control’. Murphy, in short, steers a cautious and considered path
between ‘over-socialised’ and ‘under-socialised’ views of nature. See also
Franklin (2001) and Soper (1995) for useful discussions of these issues.
3. It is significant in fact, in this latter case, that Pirani and Varga (2005) are the
editors of a special issue of the International Sociological Association journal
Current Sociology on ‘Bodily order. Mind, emotion and social memory’,
including a section specifically devoted to ‘Biological body and cognitive
processes’. The monograph, in this respect, seeks a ‘dialogical approach’ that
aims to integrate the social and behavioural sciences within ‘the living web of
the developmental process’ (Pirani and Varga, 2005: 190).
4. Sayer (2000) in fact goes further here, arguing, in the face of anti-essentialism,
for a ‘moderate’, non-deterministic essentialism (vis-a-vis a strong
deterministic essentialism); something, he claims, in keeping with the above
observations, which is necessary for a social science with critical or
emancipatory potential.
5. Thanks to one of the anonymous referees of this article for drawing this point
to my attention.
6. Haraway’s (leaky) position is not without its problems, however, particularly as
far as information flows and the integrity of organisms as bounded entities are
concerned. See Birke (1999) for example.
7. Shilling’s own preferred term here is corporeal realism, rather than
corporealism, on the grounds that the latter risks eliding a specific approach to
the body with a general theoretical perspective (personal communication).
8. Freund (pers. comm.) wishes to speak of a radical version of constructionism
here in the sense that it involves recognition of the fact that the social is not
merely discursive and signals a programmatic intent to explore the reciprocal
effects of the social on the biological or material and the biological or material
on the social. Murphy’s (2002: 321) notion of a ‘realist constructionism’ is a
similarly intriguing and important one: ‘the more social constructionism adopts
a realist underpinning’, he argues, ‘the stronger it gets’.
9. Newton’s (2003a) paper, in fact, is specifically targeted at those material-
corporeal sociologist for whom, in his view, the stress, emotion, health link is
crucial. See Williams (2003d) for a rejoinder to these charges.
10. Thanks again to one of the anonymous referees of this article for drawing this
point to my attention.
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